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Second Thoughts: Who Almost
Participates in an IDA?
Self-selection into social intervention programs may bias the estimates of treatment impact. Data from an Individual
Development Account (IDA) program (N = 758) are used to examine the self-selection process. Persons who applied
but did not enroll are assumed to have had “second thoughts” about program participation. Multivariate logistic
regression predicted second thoughts and showed that having children in the household and negative net worth, along
with not owning a vehicle, were positively related to having second thoughts. Those saving for an education were more
likely than those saving for a home or business to have second thoughts. Implications for social service administration
and impact evaluation of IDAs are shared.
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Asset-based approaches to social welfare policy supplement traditional income maintenance welfare
policies by encouraging savings and ownership of assets. Sherraden (1991) outlined the asset-based
theory of social welfare and introduced Individual Development Accounts (IDAs) to encourage
savings and asset accumulation among low-income individuals and families. IDAs are matched
savings accounts for persons with low incomes. As a policy mechanism, IDAs represent an
advancement towards universal and progressive asset-based policies for the entire population
(Sherraden, 1991). In 1998, the Assets for Independence Act (AFIA) established funding for IDA
programs nationwide.
IDAs offer a unique set of mechanisms to encourage savings and asset accumulation. In some ways,
IDAs function as a “poor person’s 401(k),” replacing tax benefits with explicitly defined matches to
fund short-term capacity building. A match is provided for participants who save towards home
purchase or repair, post-secondary education, or microenterprise. Match rates in AFIA are relatively
high—usually 1:1 or 2:1 or even higher—and serve both to attract people to the program and to
turn small amounts of saving into substantial asset accumulation. The acquisition of a home, college
education, or small business capital may be transformational for some low-income people. IDA
programs require participants to attend financial education courses, and IDA program staff provide
case management to help participants reach their specified asset goals. The programs are typically
administered by non-profit organizations and funded by a variety of private and public support. The
number of IDA programs has exploded in the past decade; there were well over 500 IDA programs
and 50,000 participations nationwide as of 2005 (Boshara, 2005). More than 40 states had some type
of IDA policy as of 2003 (Edwards & Mason, 2003).
Knowledge about the effects of IDAs comes mostly from the American Dream Demonstration
(ADD), which included over 2,300 IDA participants nationwide. One program site in Tulsa,
Oklahoma implemented an experimental research design. Research from ADD showed a number of
positive effects of participation, but two results stand out. First, people with low incomes saved in
IDAs: the average monthly net deposit of active participants in a nationwide demonstration was
$32.44 (Schreiner & Sherraden, 2007). A second key finding is that institutional factors of IDA
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programs were better predictors of savings outcomes than the individual characteristics of
participants (Schreiner & Sherraden, 2007). These findings suggest that policy choices influence
savings outcomes in IDAs. The key institutional variables include access, information, incentives,
facilitation, and expectations (Schreiner & Sherraden, 2007). It follows that the goal of social policy
is to tailor these institutional combinations to maximize outcomes.
Despite the promising findings from ADD research, several issues relevant to policy remain
unexplored. A real concern is whether IDAs are reaching the poor and reducing asset inequality.
Undoubtedly, the hundreds of IDA programs operating nationwide are improving access to wealthbuilding mechanisms for thousands of low-income Americans. However, the application,
enrollment, and participation process for IDAs remains voluntary for those who are eligible.
This research studies the voluntary self-selection process into IDAs by examining characteristics of
persons who choose not to participate. Rare pre-participation data from a large IDA program are
used to identify differences between persons who were qualified to participate, but who did not
follow-through with opening an account (“almost-participants”), and those who eventually went on
to participate in the program. Participants are viewed as those who self-selected into the program;
almost-participants are those who dropped out before enrolling.
Selection is especially problematic for inferring program impact when anticipated outcomes of an
intervention are correlated with actual outcomes. The expectations of what IDA participation entails
matter for the decision whether or not to participate. Manksi (1995) suggests that, “the observable
distribution of outcomes experienced by those who actually enroll may differ from the censored
distribution of outcomes that non-enrollees [almost participants] would have experienced if they had
enrolled” (p. 33). Persons who almost participate are extremely interesting for social service
administration and policy because at some point they had an interest in IDAs and went through the
trouble of the application process, but later changed their minds.
For the first time in the IDA literature, this paper examines self-selection into a large IDA program
at the time of application, i.e. drop-out on the front end. We ask two questions in this study. First, to
what extent can individual and household characteristics explain second thoughts? Second, to what
extent can asset ownership explain second thoughts? Information about trends in program
participation may help future IDA administrators and social work practitioners expand access to
under-served subgroups of the population of low-income individuals and families. Future IDA
practitioners and policymakers can use this information to actively target and recruit participants at
risk for not enrolling. Findings will inform future research on IDAs that should acknowledge the
self-selection process when estimating treatment impact.
Following is a literature review on participation in voluntary individual savings accounts such as
Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs), 401(k)s, and IDAs. The next section describes the data and
empirical findings. A discussion section with limitations and implications for policy and future
research is then presented.
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Literature Review
Participation in retirement plans
Although IRAs and 401(k)s differ from IDAs in target population, purpose, and institutional
structure, research on uptake and participation provides clues about what matters for IDA
participation (and thus for what independent variables to control for when analyzing what
differentiates participants from almost-participants). Individual characteristics appear to be related to
participation in IRAs and 401(k)s. Research shows that age, gender, marital status, income,
education, race/ethnicity, employment status, and previous saving are significantly related to
participation (Munnell, Sunden, & Taylor, 2001/2002; Sprinstead & Wilson 2000). Age was
positively associated with participation because earnings increase with age and because retirement is
more salient for older workers. Even and Macpherson (2000) reported that single men are
particularly unlikely to participate in 401(k) plans. In general, however, men have a higher
participation rate than women in both IRAs and 401(k)s (Sprinstead & Wilson 2000). Employees
with more education are more likely to enroll in 401(k)s because, according to Copeland (2001), they
have a better understanding of the benefits of saving for retirement. For both IRAs and 401(k)s,
participation rates are highest for “other” races (including Asian Americans and American Indians),
followed by Caucasians and African Americans (Munnell, et al., 2001/2002; Sprinstead & Wilson,
2000).
Income and wealth are positively related to participation in IRAs and 401(k)s (Munnell, et al.,
2001/2002). Persons with higher incomes and wealth, by definition, have more surplus income to
invest in retirement plans. In contrast, low-income households are less likely to participate because
they have less money available after paying their bills and because, given their low incomes, Social
Security will provide higher replacement rates when they retire (Munnell, et al., 2001/2002).
Participation in IDAs
Research has identified two primary features of IDA participants (Sherraden, et al., 2000). First,
participants are generally the “working poor.” Compared to the general low-income population, they
tend to have more education and a greater probability of owning a bank account. Second,
participants tend to be among the more disadvantaged (female, African American, and single) of the
“working poor” (Schreiner & Sherraden, 2007).
Dropping out of the IDA program on the back end of the program has been the focus of at least
one study. Schreiner and Sherraden (2005) concluded that human capital in education or experience,
financial capital in bank accounts, social capital in marriage, and physical capital in homes or cars
were negatively associated with dropping out. Income and receipt of means-tested public assistance
were not linked with drop-out.
Knowledge about IDA participation can also be inferred from research on IDA program outcomes.
ADD savers (defined as making savings deposits of at least $100) were more likely to be older,
married, educated, and without substantial debt (Schreiner & Sherraden, 2007). In a separate study,
the presence of children in the household and being African American were negatively associated
with matched withdrawals (Mills, Gale, Patterson, & Apostolov, 2006). Children in the home may be
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an especially important influence on participation as households with children may face particular
challenges in trying to save (Aizcorbe, Kennickell, & Moore, 2003).
The research on the relationship between some demographic characteristics and program outcomes
is not consistent, however. For example, savers in ADD were more likely to be female (Schreiner &
Sherraden, 2007), but being female was negatively associated with making a matched withdrawal in
the Tulsa program (Mills, et al., 2006). Additionally, savers in ADD were more likely to be married,
but being divorced was positively associated with making a matched withdrawal in Tulsa (Mills, et
al., 2006). The non-randomly selected samples and the relatively low participation rates of minority
groups other than African Americans make it difficult to generalize to the entire population of lowincome individuals and families.
Assets and program participation
Sherraden (1991) theorized that asset ownership would promote additional asset development.
Findings from ADD support this proposition: the unbanked (no savings or checking account) and
persons with savings accounts only were less likely to be a saver (defined as saving at least $100 or
more in the account) compared to participants with both types of accounts (Schreiner & Sherraden,
2007). Moreover, home owners were much more likely to save compared to non-home owners in
both the ADD and the Tulsa research (Mills, et al., 2006; Schreiner & Sherraden, 2007). Bank
account and home ownership were positively related to making a matched withdrawal, while car
ownership was not (Mills, et al., 2006).
Data and Methods
The Kahikū IDA program
The Kahikū IDA program was administered by ALU LIKE, Inc. (ALI), a large community-based
not-for-profit social service agency located in Honolulu, HI. Founded in 1975, ALI’s mission is to
kōkua (help) Hawaiian Natives who are committed to achieving their potential for themselves, their
families, and communities. Applicants were recruited to participate through public advertisement
and referral throughout all five major Hawaiian islands: Kauai, O‘ahu, Molokai, Maui, and Hawai‘i.
To be eligible for Kahikū, participants had to demonstrate that their total household income was less
than 200% of the federal poverty guidelines and that they owned assets worth less than $10,000
(excluding the value of the primary residence and one vehicle). Persons were automatically eligible to
participate if they received Temporary Aid for Needy Families (TANF), or were eligible for the
Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). Each individual was required to demonstrate their Native
Hawaiian ancestry with a birth certificate. In total, 758 individuals applied to the program. Kahikū
was one of the larger IDA programs in the country; the average size of AFIA funded programs
during this time was only 90 accounts (Report to Congress, 2006).
Program participation is defined as opening an IDA account and involves two distinct phenomena.
The first process is application to the program. It is assumed that individuals applied to the program
after learning about it through direct recruitment by the non-profit organization, by word of mouth
from friends or family, or some other process. The second phenomenon is enrollment. To enroll,
participants must have met eligibility requirements. Additionally, we assume that those who enrolled
were motivated to save and perceived that IDA participation would lead to some self-benefit

CENTER FOR SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY IN ST. LOUIS

4

SECOND THOUGHTS: WHO ALMOST PARTICIPATES IN AN IDA PROGRAM?

compared to non-enrollment. On the contrary, we assume that almost-participants perceived that
the costs of IDA participation outweighed the benefits. By definition, they had second thoughts.
IDA program participation included several activities. First, participants identified one asset savings
goal, declared a monthly savings target, and opened a savings account. The qualified asset goals were
first-time home purchase, postsecondary education fees, business costs, and home repair. The
account term was 24 months, during which each participant was provided generalized case
management. Receipt of the match was conditional upon completion of general and asset-specific
financial literacy classes. Match rates varied: 3:1 for home ownership; and 2:1 for education,
business, and home repair. The savings cap was set to $500 per year. In other words, a participant
saving towards home ownership could contribute up to $1,000 over two years ($42 per month) and,
upon meeting other program requirements, receive the matched subsidy of $3,000 for a total
matched withdrawal of $4,000 for down payment on a home.
The data were collected by ALI upon enrollment to the program (1999 to 2003). Each interested
individual completed a Participant Background Information Form. The information included 49
items to measure demographic details, income, assets, and liabilities. The data were converted to an
electronic database for analysis.
A series of actions were taken to prepare the data for analysis. First, a subset of participants saving
for home repair was removed from the sample (n = 32; 4.2%) to facilitate comparison among the
major savings goals of home ownership, postsecondary education, and microenterprise. The final
sample size was 726.
Measurement
The dependent variable of interest is having second thoughts, defined as persons who applied and
were qualified but did not open an IDA account (second thoughts = 1; IDA account holder = 0).
Nine individual- and family-level variables were analyzed. Variables were coded as follows: gender
(female = 1; male = 0), age at enrollment (continuous), marital status (married = 1; non-married =
0), children present in the household (children = 1; no children = 0), employment status (less than
full time employed = 1; full time employment or more = 0), and welfare receipt (TANF receipt = 1;
no TANF = 0). Human capital was measured as three levels (high school or less, some college, and
college degree), with college degree holding as the reference group. The income-to-needs ratio—
total household income over the family size adjusted Federal Poverty Guidelines for the year of
enrollment—was used as the measure of household income. The intended savings goal of each
participant was dummy-coded for education savers and business savers (home ownership was the
reference group).
A total of eight asset and liability variables were hypothesized to influence the decision to have
second thoughts. A sum liability variable was included as the total self-reported value of vehicle
loans, home mortgages, business loans, liabilities to friends and family, household bills overdue,
credit card debt, student loans, and medical bills. To address the moderate-heavy positive skewness
in liabilities, data were transformed with log base 10 (Tabachnik & Fidell, 2001). Net worth was
calculated as total assets minus total debts, with positive values = 1 and negative values = 0.
Remaining asset variables were dichotomous (presence of asset = 1; no asset = 0) and included
ownership of vehicle, home, business, stocks or investments, checking account, and savings account.
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Results
The first step in the analysis was to compare the bivariate relationship between each independent
variable and the two groups: those who enrolled and those who did not. This procedure used the
chi-squared test of significance for categorical variables and independent t-tests for continuous
variables.
Table 1 describes the socioeconomic characteristics of the 520 participants and 206 almostparticipants in the Kahikū sample. A pattern emerges revealing strong differences between those
who ultimately participated and those who had second thoughts. Almost-participants were more
likely to have children in the household, be employed less than full-time, and save for postsecondary
education. The almost-participants were less likely than participants to have positive net worth, own
vehicles, own homes, own checking accounts, own savings accounts, and save for home ownership.
Overall, the applicants who had second thoughts compared to those who eventually enrolled were
more disadvantaged in family, employment, and asset characteristics.
Table 1. Bivariate characteristics of IDA participants and almost-participants
Participants
Almost-participants
n = 520
n = 206
Variable
Female
Age at enrollment (M / SD)
Married
Children in the household
High school or less
Some college
Employed less than full-time
TANF receipt
Income to needs (M / SD)
Savings goal
Home
Education
Business
Assets and liability variables
Liabilities sum LN (M / SD)
Net worth positive
Vehicle
Home
Business
Stocks investments
Checking account
Savings account
*p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01.

n (%)
358 (69.38)
34.03 (11.24)
201 (39.03)
375 (81.88)
256 (49.61)
164 (31.78)
254 (50.81)
95 (18.74)
1.19 (.64)

n (%)
146 (71.22)
33.81 (10.16)
75 (36.76)
170 (89.01)
101 (49.27)
72 (35.12)
118 (60.51)
50 (24.88)
1.08 (.71)

Test statistic
.24
.23
.32
5.09*
.01
.74
5.32*
3.33
.31

n missing
5
21
7
77
5
5
31
18
46

272 (53.23)
134 (26.22)
105 (20.55)

80 (40.82)
84 (42.86)
32 (16.33)

8.73**
18.38***
1.62

19
19
19

3.08 (1.45)
277 (53.89)
386 (75.54)
59 (11.51)
72 (14.04)
119 (23.38)
393 (76.91)
383 (75.54)

3.01 (1.53)
76 (37.07)
125 (62.19)
13 (6.51)
26 (13.07)
49 (24.38)
140 (69.65)
136 (67.01)

.64
16.56***
12.69***
3.96*
.11
.08
4.04*
5.39*

7
7
14
13
14
16
14
16

Before running the multivariate regression models, multiple imputation (MI) was used to replace
missing values on the variables (missing frequency reported in column 5 of Table 1). The MI
technique is the preferred method for handling missing item-level data (Graham, 2009; Little &
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Rubin, 2002). The Markov Chain Monte Carlo method in SAS was used to create five independent
data sets. The analyses were conducted on each set of imputed data. Results of the five models were
then analyzed with SAS PROC MIANALYZE which reads parameter estimates and the associated
covariance matrix and then derives multivariate inferences for the generated parameters. Compared
to other techniques to treat missing data, MI is less sensitive to the missing data mechanism and
capable of providing valid estimates even in small samples (McKnight, McKnight, Sidani, & Aurelio,
2007).
Multivariate analysis
The first model regressed the decision to have second thoughts upon the nine demographic
variables and the savings goal variables (see Table 2). Estimates were generated by maximum
likelihood estimation. Overall, the model was significantly different from zero (χ2, [df =11, N = 726]
= 27.45, p < .01). The results showed that families with children were more likely to have second
thoughts. Additionally, the results indicated that education savers were much more likely than home
savers to have second thoughts. While this information was helpful to understand demographic
characteristics associated with second thoughts, the explanatory power of the model was relatively
low (max rescaled R-square = .05).
The second step of the analysis added a block of eight asset and liability variables to the regression
model. Results are shown in Columns 4-5 in Table 2. The model was significantly different from
zero for explaining the decision to have second thoughts about opening an IDA (χ2 [df = 19, N =
726] = 63.02, p < .01). Children in the household and education savers remained significantly related
to the likelihood of having second thoughts. Among the additional eight variables, positive net
worth and vehicles were related to the outcome variable. Individuals with positive net worth were
nearly 50% less likely than persons with negative net worth to have second thoughts. Vehicle
owners were also much less likely to have second thoughts when compared to non-vehicle owners
(OR = .58).
The addition of the asset and liability variables significantly increased the explanatory power of the
final model. The max-scaled R-square increased 140% (from .05 to .12). The test of difference in
chi-square values between models 1 and 2 (χ2 [df = 8, N = 726] = 35.57) was significant (p < .01). A
probit model was tested, which produced comparable estimates for each of the independent
variables. The final model showed that many significant bivariate relationships faded in the
multivariate model. For example, employment status, home ownership, checking account
ownership, and savings account ownership were not related to almost-participation when controlling
for the other variables.
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Table 2. Results of Logistic Regression Models Predicting Second Thoughts
Variable
Estimate (SE)
OR
Estimate (SE)
Intercept
-2.28 (0.51)**
-1.88 (0.61)**
Female
-0.09 (0.19)
0.92
-0.07 (0.21)
Age at enrollment
0.01 (0.01)
1.01
0.01 (0.01)
Married
-0.10 (0.18)
0.91
-0.03 (0.19)
Children in the household
0.61 (0.29)*
1.82
0.74 (0.31)*
High school or less
0.14 (0.24)
1.15
0.14 (0.26)
Some college
0.17(0.26)
1.18
0.15 (0.27)
Employed less than full-time
0.22 (0.19)
1.25
0.22 (0.21)
TANF receipt
0.21 (0.21)
1.23
0.12 (0.23)
Income to needs
0.13 (0.14)
1.14
0.21 (0.15)
Savings goal
Education
0.71 (0.21)**
2.01
0.82 (0.23)**
Business
0.23 (0.24)
1.26
0.41 (0.25)
Assets and liability variables
Liabilities sum LN
-0.01 (0.08)
Net worth positive
-0.67 (0.22)***
Vehicle
-0.55 (0.22)*
Home
-0.56 (0.38)
Business
0.09 (0.27)
Stocks investments
0.33 (0.23)
Checking account
-0.10 (0.22)
Savings account
-0.21 (0.21)
R-square max-rescaled
.053
.119
N
726
726
*p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01.

OR
0.93
1.01
0.97
2.11
1.15
1.16
1.25
1.13
1.24
2.27
1.51
0.99
0.51
0.58
0.57
1.09
1.39
0.91
0.81

Figure 1 is provided to illustrate how the probability of having second thoughts differed for persons
with positive net worth and negative net worth across the life course (age 18-75). Using the
procedure by Morillas (2007) as an example, all other independent variables were set at their means.
Persons with positive net worth were about half as likely to have second thoughts as persons with
negative net worth. Across the life course, the gap in the probability of having second thoughts
increased between those with positive and negative net worth. From age 25 to 75 the gap increased
by .03 (from .12 at age 25, .14 at age 50, to .15 at age 75).
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Figure 1. Probability of having second thoughts across the life span (age 18 to 75) for persons who
reported positive and negative net worth on their application to the program. The difference
between positive net worth and negative worth is significant (p < .05) across all years.

Multinomial logistic regression was then used to discern factors associated with particular savings
goals because saving for education was a strong predictor of having second thoughts (full regression
results not shown, but available from the author). The key finding from this analysis showed that
employment status factored into the decision to save for education. Those who were employed less
than full-time were relatively more likely to save for education and less likely to save for home
ownership. Additionally, stock investment holders were relatively more likely to save for education
than a home or business.
Discussion
It has been over ten years since federal legislation established funding for IDA programs nationwide.
The two primary criticisms of IDA policies are that (a) the poor may not have sufficient income to
save (immediacy), and (b) the amounts acquired in IDA programs may not be sufficient enough to
leverage people out of poverty (adequacy) (Bernstein, 2005). This paper raises a third issue: IDAs
may only be attractive to a certain sub-population of low-income people (selectivity). The findings
from this sample show that IDAs may be helping only a selective group of relatively less asset-poor
people to save and build wealth.
Using unique data from applications to a large IDA program, the primary finding in this study is that
family status, savings goal, and asset ownership are associated with the decision to participate in this
IDA program. Persons typically considered disadvantaged—those with children who have negative
net worth and are without vehicles—are especially likely to have second thoughts about the IDA
program and ultimately fail to uptake the program. These “almost-participants” are precisely those
for whom small changes in social service policy might matter most. The finding that family-level
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constraints and net worth affect low-income families' decisions to enter an IDA program
supplements the literature on IDA dropout on the back end (Schreiner & Sherraden, 2005).
The presence of children in the household appears to negatively affect the decision to participate.
Past IDA research found a similar negative relationship between children in the household and
being an IDA graduate (Mills, et al., 2006). One interpretation is that applicants with children face
heightened financial strains (Aizcorbe, Kennickell, & Moore, 2003). For example, the presence of
children in the household increases housing, food, and transportation costs. Active participation in
an IDA program that requires considerable time (financial education classes, case management) and
financial (savings) resources may have been perceived as too much in the face of already challenging
family circumstances. This finding is especially concerning because family forms a critical dimension
of Native Hawaiian well-being (DeBarshye, Yuen, Nakamura, & Stern, 2006) and Native Hawaiian
family size (3.47) is much larger than the state average (2.77; Naya, 2007).
The study builds on the asset-based theory of social welfare (Sherraden, 1991). Adding the asset and
liability variables to the model significantly raised the explanatory power of the model. Specifically,
persons with positive net worth and vehicles were more likely to participate compared to persons
with negative net worth and without vehicles. Having positive net worth is an indicator that one's
past financial practices have led them to at least some degree of financial stability. Vehicle ownership
is important for mobility, and owning a vehicle is increasingly important for successful participation
in the job market (Raphael & Stoll, 2001). Furthermore, vehicle ownership would facilitate
transportation to case management meetings with IDA staff and to financial education classes.
Many would hypothesize that income would be positively associated with enrollment. Research on
retirement savings plans showing higher-income persons were more likely to save supports this idea
(Munnell, et al., 2001/2002). Those with relatively higher incomes, and therefore relatively more
surplus income, may have been more confident about their prospects of adhering to the savings
requirements in the IDA. However, consistent with previous research on IDA outcomes (Schreiner
& Sherraden, 2007) and on drop-out at the back end (Schreiner & Sherraden, 2005), the findings
belie the proposition that income is associated with IDA participation.
Limitations
A number of limitations warrant consideration in this study. First, the data are limited to only one
IDA program. Thus, there was no program-to-program variation in this dataset that may have
explained second thoughts. Furthermore, the data were limited to demographic, income, and asset
variables, and were not able to explain much of the variance in the likelihood of being an almostparticipant. Schreiner & Sherraden (2005) found that institutional features matter for dropout on the
back end of IDA programs. We suspect they are also related to drop out on the front end. Last, the
high frequency of missing data is a limitation in the item-level data. While the MI technique is the
preferred technique for treating missing data, the procedure is not without limitations (McKnight, et
al., 2007).
Implications
The ultimate goal of IDAs is to extend to persons with low incomes the same asset-building policies
that are available to the relatively more affluent. The reality is that many IDA programs have long
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wait-lists and many people are not receiving access. To improve access, policies and programs need
to understand the heterogeneous nature of the low-income population and target services to hardto-reach subgroups among the poor. Administrators ought to continually evaluate who is using
services and who is being left out. In a worst case scenario, by leaving out the relatively worse off
among the poor, IDAs may be exacerbating economic inequalities by leaving the neediest further
behind.
The findings of this study have a number of implications for administration of IDA programs. The
importance of asset and family constraints reported in this study relate to the immediacy critique of
asset policies outlined by Bernstein (2005) that questions whether people in poverty can save in the
face of strong consumption demands (i.e., shelter, food, transportation, health care). In this sample,
however, it is not income or education that matters for participation. Instead, assets and children in
the home are significantly related to program uptake. Because it may be difficult for policies to
address children in the household, policies to complement IDAs or variations of IDA programs that
promote asset ownership among the difficult-to-reach asset-poor are recommended. A major
concern is that until the asset poor develop some level of assets, they may be reluctant to participate
in IDA programs.
Another policy option to encourage uptake would be to make the matched subsidy conditional upon
a relative savings goal instead of an absolute savings goal. In the face of challenging circumstances
families with children and negative net worth and without vehicles may have perceived the absolute
savings goals as unattainable. Relative savings goals, on the other hand, could make the match
subsidy conditional on a proportion of improvement in the assets-to-debts ratio or a proportional
increase in savings balance. Implementing relative savings goals, however, would increase the
complexity and administrative burden on IDA program staff.
In terms of future social service research, there is a need to empirically evaluate service delivery and,
specifically, those at-risk for selecting out of programs. Studies that test institutional program
designs would be especially informative. For example, a promising avenue is an exit survey that
directly asks people why they have yet to open an account and which—if any—personal
characteristics and program characteristics influenced the decision. Qualitative research might be an
especially meaningful methodology for uncovering the cognitive, behavioral, and motivational
reasons for non-participation.
The findings associated with non-participation have an important implication for the evaluation of
program impacts. More randomized research designs are necessary to validly infer program impact
that can be generalized to the population of low-income persons, especially considering that factors
predicting enrollment are usually unobserved. Randomization would control for pre-existing
differences that would be impossible with matching or statistical control, the most commonly used
methods.
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